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Abstract
We elicit distributional fairness ideals of impartial spectators using an incentivized 
experiment in a large and heterogeneous sample of the German population. We doc-
ument several empirical facts: (i) egalitarianism is more popular than efficiency- and 
maxi-min ideals; (ii) females are more egalitarian than men; (iii) men are relatively 
more efficiency minded; (iv) left-leaning voters are more likely to be egalitarians, 
whereas right-leaning voters are more likely to be efficiency-minded; and (v) young 
and high-educated participants hold different fairness ideals than the rest of the pop-
ulation. Moreover, we show that fairness ideals predict preferences for redistribution 
and intervention by the government, as well as actual charitable giving, even after 
controlling for a range of covariates. This paper thus contributes to our understand-
ing of the underpinnings of voting behavior and ideological preferences and to the 
literature that links laboratory measures and field behavior.
1 Introduction
How should we divide the pie? Despite the apparent simplicity of this question, the 
division of scarce resources is one of the most fundamental problems we face. In 
any distributional question, scarcity of means and plurality of goals collide, while 
material self-interest and social concerns might conflict. Recent empirical evidence 
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shows that individuals tend to disagree on how the trade-off between personal 
income and fairness considerations is best resolved and on what the fairest outcome 
is. It is often assumed that left-wing voters are relatively egalitarian, while the politi-
cal right is thought to focus more on efficiency. A disagreement about which quali-
ties make a distribution or outcome desirable can greatly complicate any discussion 
that impacts the final distribution. If the difference of opinion between the political 
left and right is driven by fundamentally different views on what is fair, it is not 
surprising that political debate on issues like redistribution, the welfare system, or 
the provision of universal health care becomes heated. Finding an acceptable middle 
ground will require all parties to make concessions with regard to their moral ideals. 
Knowledge about these ideals can therefore greatly benefit the search for acceptable 
policies and achievable reform.
In this paper, we measure the prevalence of four stylized distributional fairness 
types and relate them to personal characteristics and political preferences (an addi-
tional result in the appendix also relates fairness preference to charitable giving). 
To do so, we run an incentivized experiment in a large and heterogeneous sample 
(N = 2890 completed responses) of the German population in the German Internet 
Panel (GIP). In two tasks, the decision maker selects an allocation of money for 
two other, anonymous persons. By paying other respondents the chosen amounts, 
we incentivize decision makers to think about which distribution they consider fair.1 
We consider four normative criteria (types) suggested in the literature: equality of 
outcomes (egalitarian), maximizing the minimum (maxi-min), maximizing the total 
amount of resources (efficiency), and maximizing the highest outcome (maxi-max). 
The allocations are constructed in such a way that each of the criteria leads to a dif-
ferent choice by a decision maker.
Spectator-type moral ideals are of significant importance in the organization of 
societies. In many political or policy decisions, an individual’s self-interest is not, or 
only indirectly, involved. Voters are asked to decide on many policy proposals that 
may never directly affect them, from the availability of birth control to women (for 
male voters), to a change in tax rates for incomes above their own, to the placement 
of a large power plant far away from their homes. Still, males, US conservatives, 
unions, and environmental organizations, respectively, have put up very strong cam-
paigns around these proposals. Clearly these policies matter to voters, even if they 
are not personally affected by them. In the economic sphere, a spectator’s view plays 
a vital part when a company or person declares bankruptcy. A impartial third party 
is brought in to determine a fair way of distributing the (insufficient) assets over the 
competing claims. Despite the importance of spectator’s judgments, existing empiri-
cal evidence focuses mostly on situations where the decision maker has a personal 
monetary stake in the outcome and thus faces a potential trade-off between morals 
1 Decision makers in our experiment are not directly paid for their choices. One could therefore argue 
that only if people have social preferences, that is, if they care about the payoffs to other people, will 
their decisions actually be incentivized. There is, however, abundant evidence that people do care about 
payoffs of others in economically-relevant ways. Hence, pecuniary income for others can serve as incen-
tives for third-party observers who do not have a personal direct stake in the allocation.
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and self-interest. In this paper we avoid this trade-off completely and focus on spec-
tator ideals directly.
If individuals want to express their fairness ideals at a societal level, they can do 
so by voting for parties or policies that bring outcomes closer to those ideals. The 
political sphere is a good test case for the abstract, spectator-type fairness ideals, as 
the link between individual votes and societal outcomes is weak. If fairness ideals 
shape voting behavior, one would expect that individuals with egalitarian fairness 
ideals are more likely to support redistributive policies as these reduce inequality. 
Since these interventions tend to come at a cost, one would expect individuals who 
put more weight on efficiency are less likely to support such policies. A prefer-
ence for more (less) redistribution should also increase the tendency of individuals 
to vote for more left-wing (right-wing) parties since left-wing parties tend to focus 
more on equality over efficiency than right-wing parties, ceteris paribus. Hence, we 
also expect these preferences to influence voter behavior after controlling for other 
relevant factors.
Our main findings are that fairness preferences significantly relate to (i) support 
for government interventions to reduce inequality and (ii) views on tax rates, (iii) 
voting behavior. Secondary results, presented in the Appendix, show that egalitarian 
types are also more likely to donate money to charity than all other types. All these 
results continue to hold after including a battery of controls. Furthermore, we docu-
ment several empirical facts regarding the distribution of fairness ideals. First, our 
sample of the German population predominantly and consistently chooses egalitar-
ian allocations. From an economic point of view, these choices are striking: in both 
choice tasks the egalitarian option is (weakly) Pareto-dominated by at least one other 
allocation. Second, females are more egalitarian than males across all age groups. 
Third, males are more efficiency-minded than females. These two results are similar 
to a recurring finding in the literature on self-involved fairness that females put more 
weight on other people’s income.2 Fourth, left-leaning voters are more likely to be 
egalitarian, whereas right-leaning voters are relatively more likely to be efficiency-
minded. A noteworthy deviation from this trend can be found at the very extremes 
of the distribution. Individuals who place themselves at the extreme left or extreme 
right end of the political spectrum are overwhelmingly egalitarian. Fifth, age, edu-
cation, and earnings all significantly correlate with fairness ideals. Since these are 
exactly the characteristics which differentiate students from the general public, our 
study also contributes to the question whether the fairness ideals held by students 
are similar to those found in the rest of the population as is discussed in Cappelen 
et  al. (2007), Bellemare et  al. (2008), Gaertner and Schokkaert (2011), Cappelen 
et al. (2015) and Fisman et al. (2017) for example. However, many of these studies 
have been confined to hypothetical settings (Konow 2003), our incentivized spec-
tator design provides complementary results. Finally, maxi-max preferences are 
2 In a meta-study Engel (2011) finds i.e., that females give significantly more than men in dictator 
games. However, studies that account for the fact that men and women also make systematically different 
equity—efficiency trade—offs typically find little evidence for gender effects, see Andreoni and Vester-
lund (2001), Kerschbamer and Müller (2020), Müller (2019).
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empirically irrelevant. Given that randomly clicking individuals would have chosen 
this option in 25% of the cases, we take this as evidence that individuals make delib-
erate choices.
We proceed as follows. In Sect.  2 we briefly discuss existing theoretical and 
empirical fairness research. Section 3 describes the survey and the experiment. Sec-
tion 4 depicts the distribution and correlates of fairness views in our sample of the 
German population. Section 5 shows that fairness measures have predictive power 
for preferences about government intervention to reduce inequality, the tax rates 
and voting behavior. Section 6 concludes the article. The results regarding the cor-
relation of fairness preferences and revealed charitable giving can be found in the 
Appendix.
2  Views on distributive justice
Social scientists have shown a great interest in fairness preferences, most commonly 
in situations in which the decision maker has a stake in the distribution and has no 
uncertainty about her own position. In the laboratory, this situation is mimicked 
by the classical dictator game (Kahneman et al. 1986), in which a decision maker 
decides on how to split a pie between herself and one other person. This game has 
had a large impact through the insight that people often care about the income of 
others. These findings led to the development of social preference models (Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) that not only emphasize the perceived 
(distributional) fairness of outcomes.3
Besides the recent interest in perceived fairness of outcomes, there is a long tra-
dition of studying impartial fairness from a normative point of view in philosophy, 
economics, and political science. In this tradition, researchers are interested in how a 
decision maker should choose between different income distributions. In their semi-
nal works, Harsanyi (1953) and Rawls (1971) famously propose that the decision 
maker needs to be behind the veil of ignorance to achieve a just decision. That is, 
to make a fair decision, the decision maker should be ignorant of her own income, 
social status, wealth, abilities etc., and thus ignorant of her own stake in the out-
come. In this original position, decision makers are then able to make judgments 
about income distributions which are free of self-interest. Hence, the veil of igno-
rance can be seen as a thought experiment aimed at reaching impartiality of decision 
makers, which should lead to fair and just outcomes.
There are many ways to define and measure fairness ideals. We focus on an 
abstract spectator setting that is both easy to implement and context free. This pro-
vides a complementary approach to the more specific instruments that measure pref-
erences given certain contextual factors like production or risk (e.g. Konow 2000; 
3 By now, there is ample evidence that rejects the assumption of narrow money-maximizing behavior. 
Theoretical evidence for the view that “moral” preferences have evolutionary roots was given by, for 
example, Alger and Weibull (2013). There is also convincing evidence from biology that supports this 
statement, see Wright (2010) for an overview.
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Cappelen et al. 2013; Almås et al. 2019). All of these experiments involving fairness 
likely capture related behavioral traits. Through the abstract nature of the elicitation, 
we try to elicit preferences that transfer to different contexts more easily and are thus 
a stable aspect of preferences. The significant correlations found with policy prefer-
ences, political preferences, and charitable donations seem to indicate that they are 
indeed stable and travel across contexts.
2.1  Empirical literature
The empirical literature on fairness is split into several methodologies, with some 
studies using a set-up inspired by the veil of ignorance and others using spectator 
judgments. Most empirical papers based on the veil of ignorance are versions of 
dictator games with uncertainty about the decision maker’s position in the final allo-
cation (e.g. Bosmans and Schokkaert 2004; Schildberg-Hörisch 2010). In contrast, 
the majority of empirical papers that focus on spectator judgments are so-called 
vignette studies. These studies present hypothetical situations to participants, who 
are then asked to make a choice or judgment. The choice made reveals some aspect 
of participants’ values or social norms applicable to the situation.4 The incentivized 
impartial spectator we use in our experiments, was used by Konow (2000) to test 
the accountability principle as a basis of perceived fairness and by Cappelen et al. 
(2013) to study the impact of luck and risk on fairness preferences in spectators and 
in stakeholders and spectators, respectively.
Traub et  al. (2005) highlight the importance of the distinction between specta-
tor and veil of ignorance judgments, as well as the importance of the amount of 
information possessed by their subjects when making a moral judgment. They find 
a statistically significant difference between the choices made by subjects when 
they switch from a self-concern (veil of ignorance) to an umpire mode (impartial 
observer). In their experiments, subjects are asked to judge lotteries. Those who are 
informed about the associated probabilities of the lotteries are more inequality averse 
as umpires than as decision makers behind the veil. Subjects who do not know the 
associated probabilities are less inequality averse as umpires than as involved deci-
sion makers behind the veil. Similarly, Croson and Konow (2009) compare behavior 
behind the veil of ignorance with impartial spectators and find that “stakeholders 
are less inclined to respond to the generosity of others than are spectators”. More 
recently, Becchetti et  al. (2011) show that impartial spectators and, to a smaller 
extent, stakeholders behind-the-veil both reward talent more strongly than informed 
stakeholders.
Konow (2009) presents interesting results regarding the choices of impartial 
spectators. His vignette study shows that spectators are more likely to agree on what 
is fair when they possess more information. This finding suggests that the impartial 
spectator is an attractive approach to elicit fairness preferences. One might hope to 
find agreement when all relevant information is known. Amiel et al. (2009), using a 
4 For an excellent overview, please consult Gaertner and Schokkaert (2011).
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vignette survey with students in several countries, present evidence suggesting that 
impartial spectators behavior is impacted more by social concerns (i.e. they transfer 
more money) than involved participants. Aguiar et al. (2013) compare fairness views 
of planners behind the veil of ignorance, impartial spectators and ideal observers 
(who are assumed to be omniscient) to find out which of those procedures is most 
useful in ensuring impartiality. They find that the ideal observers choose signifi-
cantly more equal distributions than stakeholders behind the veil or impartial specta-
tors. A benevolent dictator (a third party observer) is also used in Cettolin and Riedl 
(2016) as a device to elicit fairness ideals under conditions of uncertainty. Their 
result indicates that the fairness of uncertain allocations, like their certain counter-
parts, is judged according to a variety of different ideals.
In a study related to ours, Almås et al. (2019) compare the fairness preferences of 
Scandinavians and Americans using a large-scale online experiment. They show that 
Americans and Scandinavians differ significantly in their fairness views. While they 
also use a spectator design, there are several differences to our study. Specifically, 
Almås et al. (2019) (i) employ a different experimental design, including different 
treatments and different roles (‘workers’ versus ‘spectators’); (ii) introduce luck and 
merit; (iii) use American and Scandinavian participants, not German ones; (iv) have 
a significantly smaller set of socio-demographic background information; (v) and do 
not correlate behavior in the experiment with redistributive preferences and charita-
ble giving. Differences (i) and (ii) have a strong impact on the design, as they result 
in a different set of fairness types.
In this paper, we document fairness types in a large, heterogeneous sample of the 
German population. Such samples exhibit a larger variation in demographic charac-
teristics than standard lab samples, allowing for a more accurate picture of prefer-
ences in the population. In addition, the panel vehicle offers rich information about 
subjects collected in many waves over several years. Consequently, we can correlate 
fairness ideals to a large range of demographic variables as well as to political and 
policy preferences, and charitable behavior. Moreover, we show that our parsimoni-
ous and abstract approach to classify respondents into fairness types captures impor-
tant aspects of individual preferences, that help to predict and understand voting 
behavior beyond what is contained in demographic variables.
2.2  Normative fairness ideals
Normative theory has carved out several ideal types of distributive justice. In our 
empirical analysis, we exploit the fact that these different normative theories predict 
different choice patterns and assign a fairness type to our participants based on the 
criterion that is revealed to be most important to the decision maker. This paper 
focuses on four types, egalitarian, maxi-min, efficiency, and maxi-max.
First, egalitarianism proposes a simple comparison rule for allocations (e.g., Roe-
mer 1996). In this philosophy, equality is considered the only moral or fair crite-
rion by which to judge outcomes. Hence, in this view, differences in outcomes (e.g., 
income) should be minimized. Although there is some discussion about what should 
be equalized, egalitarians are expected to redistribute windfall gains, such as any 
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earnings from the experiment, equally. In our experiment, egalitarianism violates the 
Pareto principle, as the egalitarian allocation is dominated by the maxi-min alloca-
tion. Intriguingly, we find that egalitarianism is the most popular ideal type.
Second, Rawls (1971) suggested that if people were to be placed behind the veil 
of ignorance, they would choose distributions according to the difference principle. 
This principle selects the distribution that maximizes the minimum income. Based 
on the assumed general acceptance and impartiality of the participant behind the 
veil, he argues that this maxi-min rule is the only moral or fair selection criterion. 
However, from an empirical point of view, support for this principle seems some-
what less compelling. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1990) find little support for the 
maxi-min principle, instead many participants endorse the efficiency principle with 
a floor constraint, i.e. maximize the sum as long as a minimum income is guaran-
teed.5 In contrast, Mitchell et al. (1993) find considerable support for Rawls’ maxi-
min principle in an experiment with a hypothetical society and decision makers 
behind the veil of ignorance. Similarly, Michelbach et al. (2003) find that a “consid-
erable minority” uses maxi-min as a decision criterion.
Third, the (weak) Pareto principle allows another simple approach to distribu-
tive justice. If in allocation A at least one person is better off and no one is worse 
off than in allocation A′ , then A Pareto-dominates A′ and A should be preferred to 
A
′ . While this principle is compelling, it does not provide a complete ranking of all 
potential allocations, i.e. it does not compare losses of one individual with the gains 
of another. If these losses and gains are treated equally, this boils down to the sim-
ple efficiency ranking as, for example, proposed by Posner (1983). In the monetary 
allocations in our experiments, efficiency yields the same ranking of distributions as 
Harsanyi’s Harsanyi (1953), Harsanyi (1955) utilitarianism, as long as one assumes 
that utility is (close to) linear in the sums of money involved. Hence, to the extent 
that utility functions are linear over the stakes in our experiment, utilitarianism does 
not require separate attention in our set-up. Efficiency concerns have been shown to 
play an important role in settings with personal stakes in the distribution of money 
(Charness and Rabin 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004), but less is known in situ-
ations involving impartial spectators.
Finally, one can also obtain a (partial) ranking of allocations based on the maxi-
mization of the highest income. Admittedly, this maxi-max criterion seems like a 
rather theoretical possibility. The position of the most advantaged individual does 
receive some attention in liberal thought in the Rawlsian tradition, but then mostly 
as something that might be envied (Green 2013). The maxi-max criterion gives a 
complete and transitive ranking of the alternatives (Brafman and Tennenholtz 1997). 
We included this criterion to test the reliability of our data. If it had been chosen by 
a similar number of participants as the other criteria, this could have been a signal 
of random choices. As it turns out, maxi-max preferences are empirically irrelevant 
( n = 14 ). We will therefore not discuss any empirical results relating to maxi-max 
preferences. For completeness, we will however display them in the figures and 
tables.
5 See also Frohlich et al. (1987a), Frohlich et al. (1987b) and Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992).
 D. Müller, S. Renes 
1 3
3  Data
3.1  The German internet panel
Our experiment was part of wave 20 (November 2015) of the German Internet Panel 
(GIP). The GIP is maintained by the collaborative research center 884 “Political 
Economy of Reforms” at the University of Mannheim. The GIP is an well-estab-
lished panel based on a probability-based sample of the German population between 
the ages of 16 and 75. Participants are recruited offline using face-to-face inter-
views, which precludes many of the potential data and subject issues common to 
online platforms. During recruitment, special care was taken to include people who 
generally do not have access to the internet (for example, by handing out tablets and 
computers).6 A new wave is fielded every second month and all enrolled participants 
are invited to take part. Each wave consists of a series of questions from different 
research groups and takes around 20 min to answer, so that questions have to be 
relatively short.
The repeated nature of the survey is a big advantage for our research. It allows 
us to relate our experimental measures to demographic information and informa-
tion about political and policy preferences collected in other GIP waves.7 In terms 
of topics, the GIP predominantly covers attitudes towards reform policies, the (wel-
fare) state, and general political opinions. The data from this survey are available for 
scientific use via the data archive of the GESIS Institute for Social Science. Partici-
pants are paid a flat fee for their participation in a wave, and additional payments are 
made if a participant completes all waves in a year. To this end, all participants hold 
an account with the GIP. Data about these payments are not usually available for 
research, but researchers connected to the collaborative research center can access 
them through a secure data facility. We use this data in the Appendix when we dis-
cuss charitable giving by our respondents.
3.2  The experiment
The standard approach in empirical justice research is the vignette study. Respond-
ents are confronted with a hypothetical situation and given the relevant context and 
then they are asked to provide their judgment or choice. Vignettes have proven to be 
a useful instrument in empirical justice research. However, we believe that following 
the standard methodology of experimental economics has distinct advantages in our 
setting. First, it is unclear how to relate answers in vignette studies to the political 
variables and socio-demographic characteristics that we are interested in, without 
explicitly asking about similar problems. By using an abstract frame and avoiding 
6 For more information on sampling procedures and other logistical issues please consult Blom et  al. 
(2015), Blom et al. (2016) and Blom et al. (2017). In addition, Sect. A.4 in the Appendix presents a com-
parison of characteristics of GIP participants and the German microcensus.
7 In a related study, Kerschbamer and Müller (2020) study distributional preferences of stakeholders in 
the GIP.
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loaded words like ‘fairness’ or ‘distribution’, we avoid the usual connotations asso-
ciated with such words. This approach allows us to identify underlying preferences 
without an associated context. This should make it more likely that these prefer-
ences translate to other contexts, i.e. we try to capture a stable part of individual 
preferences. Second, a common problem in online surveys like the GIP is that many 
survey participants might not be willing to read lengthy texts describing the moral 
scenario to be evaluated in a vignette. Our design allows us to be brief and work 
without extensive explanations and can therefore avoid this issue. Monetary incen-
tives are the paradigm in experimental economics, mainly to induce subjects to think 
carefully about their choices and to minimize concerns about experimenter-demand 
effects and hypothetical and social-desirability biases. As such, we consider them a 
vital part of our experiment.
The experimental task consists of two multiple-choice questions. Each question 
asks respondents to indicate their preferred allocation from four options. Each allo-
cation specifies a distribution of money over two other, unknown, and randomly 
selected participants of the same experiment. The sum of the payments in each allo-
cation is also shown to decrease cognitive burden on participants. The order of the 
options in every decision task is randomized across participants. This information is 
given to the respondents at the beginning of the experiment. No further information 
about the receivers of the money is given. As all respondents are recruited face-to-
face from the German population, they should be aware that recipients are randomly 
selected from the German population.
The allocations are designed such that each fairness ideal makes a different pre-
diction about which allocation should be chosen.8 We use the two choices also to 
check consistency. The differences between the two choices create different trade 
offs, so that subjects might switch between options if the fairness criterion is not 
very important to them, or when they select randomly. The observed choices of our 
respondents are quite consistent in the primary fairness ideal over the two choices, 
which we take as an indication that subjects considered the choices and that they 
tended to select according to the identified fairness ideal in similar questions. 
Table 1 shows the options in the two tasks.9
Table 1 lists the allocations participants could choose from for both choices. The 
average monetary value of each choice was around 20 Euro ($22 at the time the 
survey was fielded), which is more than twice the German federal minimum hourly 
wage. Winners were selected via the participant ID which identifies the responses 
of each participant over the GIP waves. This ID cannot be used to obtain any per-
sonal information, such as name and address of the person concerned. The selected 
subjects were informed about their winnings via e-mail, and payments were made 
via their account at the GIP. This procedure ensured anonymity. All of this was 
8 Screenshots of the design can be found in the Appendix.
9 The experiment presented in this paper was part of a larger set-up, combining two different experi-
ments on fairness preferences. In each of the two parts, subjects made two choices about the distribution 
of money between two other randomly-selected, anonymous respondents. The second part of this experi-
ment however involved two choices with risk in the final allocation. This second part is thus conceptually 
very different from the first part and will not be discussed in this paper.
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explained in the experimental instructions, so subjects were aware of this set-up 
before making their choices.
When explaining the incentives, we avoided the word “probability”. Instead, we 
explained that we would pay 400 randomly selected participants according to 200 
randomly-selected decisions. Participants were not eligible to be selected more than 
once for payment. We also informed participants that about 3500 respondents were 
expected to participate in the GIP wave. We believe that this approach made it eas-
ier for subjects to understand the relevant probabilities. In general, the experiment 
was short and easy to understand, which we consider a distinctive advantage of the 
impartial spectator design and the neutral frame.
All in all, 3159 participants took part in the wave 20 of the GIP. Of those, 2890 
participants completed our experiment. The GIP records the time it takes partici-
pants to complete the survey. We excluded all participants who spent less than 30 s 
on our experiment, leaving us with 2675 participants. Our conclusions remained vir-
tually identical when we include all respondents. Moreover, and more importantly, 
we exclude 486 participants who were not consistent across the two questions. In the 
main part, we consequently use the 2189 participants who chose in accordance with 
the same stylized fairness type in both decision tasks.10 We take the high degree 
of consistency as a good indication that choices were not made randomly. In the 
Appendix, we show that using only the first or the second choice to classify subjects 
does not change our results.
4  The distribution of fairness ideals in the German population
Figure 1 shows the distribution of consistent fairness types in our sample of the Ger-
man population, in total and by gender. The most popular option, with roughly half of 
the choices, is egalitarianism while maxi-min and efficiency are chosen by the other 
half of the participants. This pattern is striking, since the egalitarian option was domi-
nated by the maxi-min allocations. In economic terms, this finding implies that half of 
the participants in our sample demonstrate a willingness to reduce incomes to achieve 
Table 1  Allocations of money used in the experiments
Each cell contains an ordered pair. The first number is the monetary payment to the first receiver, the sec-
ond number the payment to the second receiver, both in Euros
Note that we allow a maxi-min decision maker to be indifferent between (8;8) and (9;8) in choice 2
Egalitarian Maxi-min Efficiency Maxi-max
Choice 1 (8;8) (10;9) (15;7) (16;2)
Choice 2 (8;8) (9;8) (12;6) (13;3)
10 We allowed for maxi-min types to be indifferent between the egalitarian and the maxi-min option in 
choice 2. That is, we do not assume that maxi-min subjects necessarily follow the stricter lexicographic 
interpretation of the maxi-min rule. Our conclusions are however hardly affected by this definition.
1 3
Fairness views and political preferences: evidence from a…
more equality. Two other findings catch the eye in Fig. 1. First, females are clearly 
more likely to prefer the egalitarian allocation, and second, males are more likely to 
prefer the efficient allocation, although egalitarians are also the predominant types 
among males ( 2 on independence of the distribution: p < 0.001).
Figure  2 depicts the fairness ideals by education: students and three groups of 
non-students. We split the sample of non-students according to the level of general 
education attained: those with no vocational training (low); those with some voca-
tional training(mid); and those who passed the admission requirements for college 
(high). The figure shows that students are different from the rest of the population. 
A 2 goodness-of-fit test rejects the null hypothesis of similarity of the distribu-
tion of students and non-students at all normal confidence levels ( 2 , p < 0.001 ). 
Even compared to the highly-educated non-students, students are less likely to 
choose the Pareto dominated egalitarian allocations. At the same time, both stu-
dents and highly-educated non-students are about two times more likely to select the 
efficiency-maximizing allocation than the low-educated respondents. These findings 
hold important implications for empirical justice research which builds on labora-
tory/classroom experiments, as it shows that the prevalence of maxi-min types and 
efficiency types might be systematically overestimated in such studies.
A similar picture emerges in Fig. 3, which shows fairness ideals by age groups. In 
particular, in the 16 to 34 age group, maxi-min is the modal choice. Whereas in all 
other age groups, egalitarians are the most numerous ( 2 , p < 0.001 ). The fraction 
of efficiency-minded people somewhat decreases with age.
Figure 4a shows fairness ideals by net monthly income. We merged the income 
brackets with the lowest and highest 10% of the distribution to avoid cells with small 
numbers of observations. While we do not find any sudden shifts in the distribu-
tion between income levels, there are some visible trends. The distribution becomes 
less ‘downward sloping’ as income increases ( 2 , p < 0.001 ). This shift is mostly 
caused by the decrease in the fraction of egalitarians and the increase in the fraction 
of efficiency-minded people in the higher income brackets. In particular, the top ten 
percent are almost as likely to choose the maxi-min allocation as they are to choose 
the egalitarian allocation. They are almost four times more likely to choose the effi-
cient allocation than the bottom ten percent.
Figure 4b shows fairness ideals by employment status. As before, we conclude 
that students (at school and at university) are the exception, rather than the rule. 
They are the only group where maxi-min as opposed to egalitarian types are modal 
and they are relatively more likely to choose according to the efficiency criterion. 
Another group that visibly stands out comprises participants who are not currently 
employed (either unemployed or homemakers). Here, egalitarians and maxi-min 
types are approximately balanced. It appears that employment status is a relatively 
strong predictor of these preferences ( 2 , p < 0.001).
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Fig. 1  Fairness ideals by gender
Fig. 2  Fairness ideals by highest education obtained. Students, no vocational training (low), with voca-
tional training (mid), grade required to start college (high)
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4.1  Regression analysis
To assess the relative importance of these factors, we try to predict the observed 
fairness types. We standardize all explanatory variables. Table 2 reports the results.
The regressions mostly confirm our earlier conclusions. We find that gender and 
education are the strongest predictors of fairness types. Males are much more likely 
to be efficiency-minded and less likely to be egalitarian. A higher education mostly 
seems to shift individuals away from egalitarian preferences. Increases in age are 
related to an increase in the fraction of egalitarians and a decrease in the efficiency-
seeking type. Although the student population clearly holds different fairness ideals 
than the rest of the population, this effect does not survive when we control for more 
covariates simultaneously. This result is an indication that students are not different 
per se, but that the difference between the student population and the non-student 
population is driven by age and education. Income is significant only in predicting 
maxi-min and efficiency-minded types (columns 1 and 3), respectively. The last var-
iable, “East” is an extra control to account for the part of Germany in which the par-
ticipant lives. It is the standardized version of a dummy equal to 1 if the participant 
lives in former East Germany.11 As can be seen from Table 2, this control does not 
appear to be a significant predictor of fairness preferences.
Fig. 3  Fairness ideals by age
11 Due to privacy concerns this dataset does not allow us differentiate between Berlin and Brandenburg 
(the state surrounding Berlin), so that inhabitants of Berlin are coded as living in former East Germany.
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5  Fairness views: relation to political and policy preferences
We now turn to our main research question—whether fairness ideals relate to policy 
preferences. Specifically, we look at three domains in which preferences and deci-
sions are likely to be influenced by fairness ideals. First, many governmental poli-
cies influence the distribution of income. We therefore expect distributional pref-
erences to influence preferences about policies, in particular for policy areas that 
directly deal with income (re-)distribution. Second, if individuals want to express 
their fairness ideals at a societal level in a democracy, they can do so by voting for 
parties with a policy platform that delivers the distribution closest to their optimal 
policy.
Fig. 4  Fairness ideals by economic status
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Since egalitarianism is defined by a dislike of inequality in our experiment. We 
hypothesize that voters who adhere to these ideals in the experiment, also display a 
greater aversion towards inequality in real life. In order to counter economic inequal-
ity in society, they can vote for parties or policies that promise to reduce inequali-
ties. This implies that egalitarians should be more likely to support redistributive 
policies and higher taxation and also tend to vote for more left-wing parties (since 
these parties tend to focus more on equality over efficiency in general) ceteris pari-
bus. Preferences for efficiency are characterized by a lower weight on equality and a 
stronger focus on efficiency. We hypothesize that individuals with such preferences 
are more likely to vote for parties that stress efficiency over equality (traditionally 
more right-wing parties) and are more likely to support policies that lead to more 
efficiency, such as lower taxes as taxes typically come with a deadweight loss.
5.1  Preferences for redistribution
To find relevant measures of policy preferences in the GIP, we first searched for 
questions that were repeated verbatim, related to redistribution or taxes, and had 
more than 1000 respondents in common with our experiment. This way, we uniquely 
identified our first policy question in three different waves. Then, we searched for 
Table 2  Explanatory power of 
individual characteristics
OLS regressions. Dependent variables are dummies that equal 1 if 
the individual is of that type. All explanatory variables are standard-
ized. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Egalitarian Maxi-min Efficiency
Male − 0.0584*** 0.0210* 0.0343***
(0.0117) (0.0116) (0.00713)
Education − 0.0756*** 0.0545*** 0.0217***
(0.0134) (0.0133) (0.00797)
Student − 0.00564 0.0168 − 0.0100*
(0.0103) (0.0107) (0.00585)
Age 0.0156 0.00121 − 0.0164*
(0.0135) (0.0137) (0.00865)
Income − 0.00487 − 0.0263* 0.0301***
(0.0132) (0.0134) (0.0103)
East 0.0166 − 0.0174 − 0.000977
(0.0133) (0.0130) (0.00789)
Constant 0.515*** 0.387*** 0.0908***
(0.0129) (0.0126) (0.00705)
Observations 1795 1795 1795
R
2 0.044 0.019 0.040
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questions about the tax system, again using the restriction that the question needed 
to have more than 1000 respondents in common with our experiment. We found one 
question that satisfied this restriction. The translated questions are (i) “Please rate 
to what extent you agree with the following statement: The government should take 
measures to reduce income inequality” (see Table 3, columns 1–3) and (ii) “Should 
people who earn more because they work more, be taxed more?” (column 4). Unlike 
the other survey items, this question brings considerations of effort. If the abstractly 
identified fairness ideals of our experiment are predictive in different contexts, they 
should still predict some of the preferences even when other aspects are also rel-
evant. In this specific question, if our respondents would be willing to accept any 
inequality that can be attributed to differences in effort, we should find no relation 
between types and choices here. The fact that we do find significant correlations, 
gives us confidence that our abstract elicitation at least partially corresponds to more 
context (tax) related distributive preferences. These questions were asked in wave 15 
Table 3  Ordinary Least Squares, robust standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01 , **p < 0.05,*p < 0.1 . Policy preferences as dependent variable, measured on a 5-point 
scale. Higher values mean more support for redistribution
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Reduce inequality Increase Income Tax
Wave W15 W17 W21 W17
Maxi-min − 0.0245 − 0.0476 0.0102 − 0.0580
(0.0528) (0.0540) (0.0582) (0.0418)
Efficiency − 0.231** − 0.434*** − 0.181* − 0.198***
(0.0959) (0.0998) (0.101) (0.0729)
Maxi-max − 0.502 − 0.578 − 0.498 − 0.148
(0.389) (0.391) (0.452) (0.287)
Male 0.126** 0.140** 0.229*** − 0.0273
(0.0532) (0.0547) (0.0571) (0.0424)
Age quantile 0.116*** 0.102*** 0.0679** 0.103***
(0.0241) (0.0249) (0.0265) (0.0196)
Income − 0.125*** − 0.147*** − 0.168*** − 0.100***
(0.0236) (0.0243) (0.0241) (0.0171)
Education 0.0379 0.0106 0.104*** 0.0577**
(0.0311) (0.0325) (0.0349) (0.0260)
Trust government − 0.0646** − 0.0612* − 0.0972*** − 0.0207
(0.0313) (0.0327) (0.0345) (0.0256)
East 0.195*** 0.193*** 0.219*** 0.0359
(0.0609) (0.0638) (0.0665) (0.0491)
Constant 2.292*** 2.524*** 2.623*** 2.087***
(0.131) (0.132) (0.141) (0.106)
Observations 1701 1686 1652 1676
R
2 0.054 0.067 0.069 0.047
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(fielded January 2015), wave 17 (fielded May 2015) and wave 21 (fielded in Janu-
ary 2016).12 In both questions, participants were asked to indicate their opinion on 
a 5-point Likert scale that runs from least willing to accept taxes and interventions 
(coded as 0), to most willing to accept taxes and interventions (coded as Table 4).13
In all regressions in Table 3, the egalitarian types are the reference group. The 
coefficients on the other three types consequently display the average difference in 
policy preference of individuals between that type and the egalitarian type. In col-
umns (1) and (3), the question was embedded in a survey experiment. The order of 
the questions in waves 15 and 21 was randomized over two groups of participants. 
We control for potential differences by including a treatment dummy (untabulated) 
in both cases. The dummy does not influence our results.
Table  3 shows that experimental fairness preferences are predictive of policy 
preferences, even after controlling for the standard battery of individual character-
istics.14 In all cases, the coefficients of the non-egalitarian types have the expected 
sign. In line with expectations, efficiency-minded people are consistently less likely 
to favor government intervention. Looking at the first three columns, it is particularly 
Table 4  Comparing the German census to the German Internet Panel
Census Consistent Census Consistent
2015 types 2015 types
State of Resi-
dence
Schleswig-Hol-
stein/Hamburg
5.66% 5.50% Age bracket 20–24 8.89% 6.99%
Niedersachsen/
Bremen
10.44% 10.60% 25–29 10.42% 9.78%
Nordrhein-West-
falen
21.66% 19.95% 30–34 10.37% 10.62%
Hessen 7.49% 7.75% 35–39 10.03% 8.73%
Rheinland-Pfalz / 
Saarland
6.19% 5.85% 40–44 10.60% 9.15%
Baden-Württem-
berg
13.15% 13.30% 45–49 13.24% 13.99%
Bayern 15.62% 16.85% 50–54 13.79% 15.25%
Berlin/Branden-
burg
7.32% 7.00% 55–59 12.04% 13.72%
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern
1.99% 2.30% 60–64 10.64% 11.78%
Sachsen 5.01% 6.10%
Sachsen-Anhalt 2.79% 2.10% Gender Female 51.23% 50.53%
Thüringen 2.68% 2.70% Male 48.77% 49.47%
12 English translations of complete questions can be found in the Appendix.
13 The distribution of answers to each of these questions is shown in Table 5.
14 We again use ordinary least squares since the marginal effects are easier to interpret. The coefficients 
from an ordered logit model are very similar in sign and significance and can be found in the tables in the 
Appendix. The Appendix also shows the same regression as displayed in Table 3, but now using only the 
first or only the second choice in the experiment to assign types. The results are very similar.
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reassuring to find that the predictive power is robust over time. Even though wave 
15 and 21 are a year apart, the relationship between our measures and participants’ 
opinions on government redistribution seems robust. It is remarkable, however, that 
we never find a significant difference between the maxi-min types and the egalitar-
ians in these policy preferences.
Looking at the control variables, we find some interesting results. First, the posi-
tive coefficient on the male dummy is remarkable. Men seem to favor more redis-
tribution and more tax intervention by the government than women, once fairness 
preferences are controlled for. Hence, our data indicates that the finding that females 
are more supportive of redistributive measures than males is driven by the differences 
in fairness ideals held by males and females. The male dummy loses significance in 
column (4), such that the generalizability of this finding remains an open question. 
The coefficient on the ‘Trust in government’ variable, measuring the trust an indi-
vidual has in the federal government, is also surprising. The negative sign in the first 
three regressions indicates that individuals who trust the government more, want the 
government to intervene less. A study by Kuziemko et al. (2015) in the US finds the 
opposite effect. Although the effect is not very strong, we find it in all waves, even 
though these are up to a year apart. This result could be specific to the German set-
ting. In Germany, trust in the government is relatively high, governmental redistribu-
tion has been a consistent part of the tax system, and after-tax inequality is relatively 
low. The feeling that the current system works well could result in both trust in the 
government and no desire for more intervention to reduce inequality. If this is the 
case, the result could easily reverse for countries like the US with less redistribution 
or less trust in the government. The coefficient on income has a negative and signifi-
cant sign. Higher-income individuals are less likely to support higher redistribution, 
which is in line with material self-interest. Moreover, younger respondents are less 
likely to favor some form of redistribution, and this effect survives when we control 
for other covariates. The effect of education on policy preferences is less consistent. 
Higher-educated individuals have a slight preference for more redistribution and are 
more likely to favor high taxes on very high incomes, but the effect is not always 
significant. This effect survives in other specifications of the model. A final result is 
that participants living in former East Germany are more positive towards govern-
ment interventions aimed at redistribution. This is not surprising given the history of 
this part of Germany, which greatly benefited from government investment after the 
fall of the Berlin wall.15 The evidence in this section shows that experimental fairness 
measures help to predict preferences for government intervention and redistribution, 
even after controlling for the standard battery of demographic covariates.
15 One could argue that this finding is surprising, because East Germany experienced the detriments of 
state-communism. Nevertheless, our finding is in line with research by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 
(2007) who show that former East Germans show greater support for state interventions than their West-
German counterparts. Former East Germans seem to trust the current government, without fearing that 
an intervention to reduce inequality could lead to the repetition of past mistakes.
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5.2  Ideology and fairness types
In this section, we study the relation of ideology, voting behavior and fairness ideals. The 
participants of the GIP are regularly asked to place themselves on the standard political 
scale from 1, ‘left’, to 11, ‘right’. We group participants into five groups and plot the rela-
tive frequency of fairness types for each group (see Fig. 5a), the answer-scales are shown 
in brackets. For the three largest groups of respondents in the center of the scale, we 
find that right-leaning participants are more likely to be efficiency-minded, while left-
leaning participants are more egalitarian. Intriguingly, this relationship breaks down at 
the extremes of the scale. At both ends we find strong egalitarian preferences.16
Next, we turn to the relation of voting behavior, and distributional fairness ide-
als. The GIP regularly asks participants what party they voted for in the last elec-
tion and what party they identify with most. We split the sample of participants into 
groups based on the party they voted for in the last election.17 The parties in Fig. 5b 
are grouped based on whether they are leftist (Die Linke, Bündis 90 - Die Grünen), 
centrist (SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP) or rightist (AfD, NPD). Figure 5b plots the differ-
ences relative to the overall distribution of fairness preferences. We calculate the 
distribution of fairness types within the sub-groups and subtract the average frac-
tions found in the entire sample. The number between brackets indicates the number 
of participants that indicated to have voted for the party. In this figure, it becomes 
clear that left-leaning voters are more likely to be egalitarians and less likely to be 
efficiency-minded than right-leaning voters ( 2 , p < 0.001 ). The trend changes at 
the far-right (NPD). The term “National Socialism” seems to have been well chosen. 
In terms of their distributive fairness ideals, the far-right is closer the far-left than to 
the center. These political extremes likely define their in-group differently.18 There 
17 The last national election to take place before our experiment was in September 2013, and the last 
GIP wave to ask about this election before our experiment was in September 2015. From left to right, the 
party Die Linke is a democratic, socialist party. Its roots can directly be traced back to the former ruling 
party in communist East Germany, the SED. The other left-wing party is The Greens (Bündnis 90 - Die 
Grünen), that was formed in 1993 and mainly focuses on environmental topics and social sustainability. 
Closer to the political center is the Social Democrats of Germany (SPD). The SPD is by far the oldest 
party in Germany and mainly focuses on social policy and traditionally represents the working class. The 
other large party at the center of the German party system is the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). 
This party, together with its Bavarian ally - the Christian Social Union (CSU) - forms the Union. Most 
of the political leaders after World War II were members of the Union. A traditional, smaller coalition 
partner of the Union is the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which supports liberal values and focuses on 
civil liberties, human rights, and free market policies. On the right-side of the political spectrum there 
are currently two parties: Alternative for Germany (AfD) a populist, right-wing to far-right party. This 
party formed as Euro-skeptic party in 2013 and increased its popularity in the wake of the refugee crisis 
around 2015. The National Democratic Party of Germany (NDP)is a right-wing nationalistic party with a 
left-wing economic policy platform. It is strongly anti-immigration and anti-establishment, but currently 
does not hold any parliamentary seats.
18 The similarities between the far-left and far-right in this survey seem surprising. We therefore com-
pared these groups further. If we take the most ideologically extreme groups in terms of self-placement, 
i.e. compare those who answer 1 to those who answer 11, we find no statistical differences in age, loca-
tion or gender, but some indications about education. However, numbers of observations are small. If we 
16 Table  8 in the Appendix reports a more detailed comparison of political extremists along different 
socio-demographic characteristics.
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is only limited empirical evidence concerning this presumed regularity in large, het-
erogeneous samples. Another interesting finding is the similarity between the estab-
lished parties. The voter-base of each of the largest three parties is extremely close 
Fig. 5  Fairness and politics
Footnote 18 (continued)
take the two most extreme groups in terms of self-placement, i.e. answers 1 and 2 compared to 10 and 
11, educational and gender differences appear. The extreme left appears to be slightly better educated and 
to attract more females. We report these tests in the Appendix, Sect. A.7.
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to the others and to the average German voter, which appears in line with the median 
voter theorem from Hotelling-Downs political competition models.
6  Conclusion
In this paper, we make several contributions to the literature. First, we elicit the dis-
tribution of impartial-spectator fairness ideals of a large and heterogeneous sample 
of the German population using an incentivized and neutrally-framed experiment. 
While distributional preferences of stakeholders have often been studied, little is 
known about the fairness views of spectators in a broader population. These fairness 
views are important, as many real-life situations, particularly in the political arena, 
are closely approximated by an impartial observer. Surprisingly, our results show 
that egalitarians form the majority of the German population. This finding is unex-
pected, since egalitarian allocations are (weakly) Pareto-dominated in our experi-
mental task.
Second, we contribute to the empirical literature that shows the plurality of fair-
ness ideals held by individuals. We document a considerable individual heterogene-
ity of fairness ideals and we also show how individual characteristics are correlated 
with support for different fairness criteria. In particular, we find differences between 
the male and female, young and old, high and low educated, student and non-stu-
dent, and high and low income participants. We therefore contribute to the emerging 
empirical literature showing it is unlikely that all individuals share the same fairness 
ideals (Cappelen et al. 2007; Fisman et al. 2007).
Third, although it is a commonly-held belief that left-wing voters are more egali-
tarian and right-wing voters are more efficiency-minded, there is surprisingly lit-
tle empirical evidence on how voters differ with respect to their distributive pref-
erences. Notable exceptions are Fisman et al. (2017) who show that conservatives 
in the United States make a different equity-efficiency trade-off, and Kerschbamer 
and Müller (2020) who find that inequality-averse, altruistic, and maxi-min subjects 
are more likely to express left-wing political attitudes, both in a stakeholder frame-
work. In our study, we relate the distributive ideals of individuals to their politi-
cal preferences and show that right-wing voters are indeed more efficiency-minded 
and left-wing voters more egalitarian. There is a noticeable break in this trend at 
the extremes, both far-left and far-right wingers are mostly egalitarian. In line with 
expectations from the Hotelling-Downs political competition models, we find that 
the German established parties are close to the median voter.
Fourth, we show that our experimentally-elicited fairness types are meaningful 
measures of underlying political and policy preferences. We show that rightist par-
ties are more likely to attract efficiency-minded individuals than leftist parties. These 
same efficiency-minded individuals are less supportive of governmental redistribu-
tion and of higher taxation. Lastly, efficiency-minded individuals are less likely to 
donate to charity than maxi-min and egalitarian types. The predictive power of our 
fairness measures is considerable, even when controlling for a battery of individual 
characteristics. These findings add to the discussion on how laboratory measures 
relate to field behavior.
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Furthermore, we present evidence suggesting that student populations hold differ-
ent fairness views than the rest of the population. This finding suggests that previous 
studies in empirical social choice have systematically overestimated the importance 
of maxi-min and efficiency-minded types. These findings thus also contribute to the 
current discussion in the experimental literature on the generalizability of results 
obtained from student samples.
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Appendix
Screenshots
Translated instructions
This part of the questionnaire is about four proposals on the distribution of money. 
The amounts of money are real and can be paid to randomly selected participants 
of the questionnaire. We kindly ask you to select a proposal on how to divide the 
money between two other participants of the questionnaire in each of the four [two] 
decision situations. We will call these two participants person 1 and person 2. All 
other participants, not only you, will make four such proposals. Not all decisions are 
going to be paid out for real in the end. Instead, the computer will randomly choose 
50 proposals made by the participants for each of the 4 decisions. This means that 
at the end 4 times 50 that is 200 proposals will be paid out for real. We estimate that 
3500 people will take part in this questionnaire (Figs. 6, 7).
For each randomly selected proposal, two randomly chosen participants will be 
selected who will receive the proposed monetary amounts. One person will be ran-
domly assigned to the role of person 1 and to the other to the role of person 2. Each 
of the two will then receive the payoff of corresponding to the relevant proposal. 
Each of the proposals made can be randomly selected for the actual payoff by the 
computer. So it could be that your proposal will be chosen and that two other par-
ticipants will receive exactly as much money as you proposed. You could also be 
selected and receive the payoff that another participant proposed. In this case the 
money will be directly transferred to your account at the GIP. None of the partici-
pants can be chosen more than once to receive money. All decisions made will of 
course stay anonymous. We will notify the winners.
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Below four proposals (A, B, C and D) on how to distribute money between per-
son 1 and person 2 are depicted. We kindly ask you to indicate which of these alter-
natives you prefer.
• Alternative A: person 1 should receive 10 Euros; person 2 should receive 9 
Euros.
• Alternative B: person 1 should receive 15 Euros; person 2 should receive 7 
Euros.
Fig. 6  Screenshot decision task 1
Fig. 7  Screenshot decision task 2
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• Alternative C: person 1 should receive 8 Euros; person 2 should receive 8 Euros.
• Alternative D: person 1 should receive 16 Euros; person 2 should receive 2 
Euros.
Please pay attention that your decision can affect how much two other (anonymous) 
randomly selected participants actually receive. Which alternative do you prefer?
Translated wording of relevant GIP questions
Income differences
Now we will deal with a different topic. Please indicate to which extent you agree 
with the following statement:
The government should take measures to reduce income differences. Keep in 
mind that these measures must be financed by taxes that would lead to reductions of 
one’s salary.
You can only give one answer: 
1. I strongly agree.
2. I agree.
3. I am indifferent.
4. I disagree.
5. I strongly disagree.
Tax equity
Should people who work more than others and therefore also earn more pay less 
or more taxes than they currently do? 
1. Pay far less taxes than they currently do.
2. Pay slightly less taxes than they currently do.
3. Pay the same amount of taxes that they currently do.
4. Pay slightly more taxes than they currently do.
5. Pay a lot more taxes than they currently do.
The demographic characteristics of the German internet panel
In this Appendix, we compare our most restrictive sample of GIP participants, the 
consistent types, to the 2015 German micro-census in terms of age, gender and state 
of residence.19 We report results from 2 goodness-of-fit tests that compare the 
frequency of demographics in our sample and the micro-census. The first part of 
Table 4 presents frequencies of different age groups between the ages of 20 and 64. 
19 The 2015 micro-census data was obtained from the German statistical agency (Statistisches Bunde-
samt) via https ://www-genes is.desta tis.de/, data code 12211.
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All things considered, the distribution of age is roughly the same in our sample com-
pared to the census: In no bracket is the difference larger than 2 percentage points, 
which gives us confident that our sample covers the full distribution of age in the 
German population. Nevertheless, the sum of smaller differences in each bin leads 
to significant 2 test ( p = 0.001 ). The distributions of gender on the other hand are 
statistically indistinguishable ( p = 0.511 ). Regarding the geographical distribution 
of our participants, we again find no significant difference to the distribution of 
respondents over the different states ( p = 0.213).20
Taken together, we find that our participants exhibit similar distribution of key 
socio-demographics as those in the micro-census, with some exceptions in certain 
age brackets. Overall, it seems fair to say that the GIP provides a large and heteroge-
neous sample with participants from all walks of life and that it does not appear to 
systematically ignore specific demographic groups of the German society.
Additional results
In this section we repeat the main regressions in the form of ordered logistical 
regression to show that our conclusions are not affected by the choice of the empiri-
cal model. Table 5 shows the distribution of support for the main policy variables. 
The three different versions of the “Inequality” questions in waves 15, 17 and 21 
show that the support for redistribution is fairly stable over time.
Figure 8 depicts the frequencies by left, center and right party. The parties are 
grouped in the same way as in Fig. 5b based on whether they are leftist (Die Linke, 
Grüne/Bündis ‘90), center parties (SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP), or right-wing (AfD, 
NPD).
Revealed charitable behavior and fairness types
In this section, we present results regarding the correlation between fairness types 
and revealed charitable behavior. All participants of the GIP receive a flat pay-
ment of four euro on their experimental account for every wave they participate in. 
Participating in all waves in a year yields an extra bonus of 10 euros, the bonus is 
reduced to 5 euro if one wave is missed and 0 if more than one wave is missed in 
any given year. Every six months the experimental account is automatically paid 
out to the participants. Participants can have the money transferred directly to their 
bank account, receive the corresponding value in Amazon vouchers, or donate it to 
charity.21 Participants set their pay-out option when registering for the GIP, but can 
change their setting at any time. Before payment, respondents receive an email that 
asks them to review their account settings with regard to the payment method, but 
only about 2% of the participants change their settings after receiving this email. 
Below we will analyze the payout in October 2015, in which 14.3% of all partici-
pants chose to donate their money to charity.
20 Note that, for data privacy concerns, the GIP groups several small states with a neighboring state into 
a common categories. We adjusted the micro-census accordingly.
21 The participants cannot choose the exact charitable organization, all donations are shared equally 
among the Red Cross, WWF and the SOS Kinderdorf.
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Giving to charity should increase with one’s concern for others’ well-being. Egal-
itarians are willing to actively reduce incomes in order to achieve equality. Con-
sequently, we expect egalitarians to be more likely to donate than the other types. 
In contrast, maxi-min types are expected to care about others’ welfare, but will not 
violate strict Pareto dominance, creating a similar but possibly smaller incentive to 
donate. Efficiency-minded individuals should show the lowest propensity to donate, 
as they do not show an indication of favoring income to those less-well-off over 
income to others. This difference may be reinforced by the possible inefficiencies 
found in charities—not every euro given to charity actually benefits the poor. Con-
sequently, efficiency-minded participants should be less likely to give to charity than 
either of the two other types (Table 6).22
Table 5  Distribution of answers to the main policy questions
Dependent Variable Reduce inequality Income tax
Wave W15 W17 W21 W17
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Completely disagree 142 4.46 156 5.22 181 6.52 91 3.06
Disagree 625 19.65 477 15.96 531 19.11 447 15.05
Neutral 796 25.02 775 25.93 625 22.5 1572 52.93
Agree 1248 39.23 1215 40.65 987 35.53 741 24.95
Completely agree 370 11.63 366 12.24 454 16.34 119 4.01
Total 3181 100 2989 100 2778 100 2970 100
Fig. 8  Fairness ideals by party votes
22 A different type of efficiency preference would be a concern for the sum of utilities in a society, i.e. 
utilitarianism. Utilitarians might actually be more likely to donate in certain settings due to the curvature 
of utility functions. However, since we measure efficiency-concerns via choices over sums of money, we 
define the efficiency concern as relating to monetary efficiency. Therefore, we predict that efficiency–
seekers are less likely than maxi–min and egalitarians to donate money. This prediction should hold here, 
since charitable organizations need to pay fixed costs and are thus not a perfectly efficient redistribution 
mechanism.
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We test these conjectures in Table  7. We regress the dummy whether a per-
son has donated to charity or not, on a set of control variables like age, income 
(in 1000 euros), gender, education levels (according to the groups used before) 
and the fairness-type dummies. Additionally, we also control for trust in the gov-
ernment and the exact amount the participants received (which depends on how 
many waves the participant answered). As before, egalitarians serve as the ref-
erence group. We find that egalitarians are significantly more likely to donate 
to charity than both maxi-min and efficiency types. The first column shows 
the results using an OLS regression as done in the main text, the correspond-
ing Logistic regression in column (2). The coefficient on efficiency in column 
(1) indicates that the donation rate decreases by six percentage points from the 
unconditional baseline of approximately 13%. The doubling of the likelihood of 
donations of the egalitarian type compared to the efficiency-minded type is both 
statistically and economically significant. As expected, the maxi-min types are 
located between efficiency-minded participants and egalitarians.
Additionally we find that older, more educated and high income individuals 
are more likely to donate to charity. In particular, the finding that richer people 
are more likely to donate money is interesting. In that sense, our experiment also 
provides suggestive evidence against the popular conclusion that the rich are 
more selfish (Trautmann et al. 2013; Smeets et al. 2015; Gsottbauer et al. 2020). 
To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the first to demonstrate the 
predictive power of third party spectator fairness views for field behavior, which 
is particularly interesting because these fairness ideals are philosophically-moti-
vated, abstract concepts.
Comparing extreme left‑ and right‑ wingers
Extreme left- or right-wingers appeared fairly similar in terms of fairness prefer-
ences in the analysis in the main text, which raises intriguing questions about the 
similarities and the differences of political extremist. We therefore provide some 
additional comparisons of extreme left- and right-wingers in Table 8. We use two 
different definitions of extremists: a strict definition that only looks at those who 
answer either 1 or 11 on the 1-11 point scale, and a wide definition that considers 
those who answer (1,2) or (10,11). For each comparison, we report the 2 statistics 
and corresponding p-values in the table. Obviously, the small number of observa-
tions (30 left- and 17 right-wingers in the former case and 124 left- and 42 right-
wingers in the latter case) requires us to interpret the conclusions with caution.
We find that females are in general less likely to hold extremist views than males. 
Moreover, female extremists are more likely to be left- and than right-wingers. East 
Germans are more likely to classify themselves as extremists in general than West 
Germans (East Germans make up around 20% of the population and GIP partici-
pants). This effect is even stronger among right-wing extremists than left-wing ones. 
Next, we find that extremists from both sides are more likely to be above average 
age (the variable young equals 1 if the participant is younger than the median age). 
Right-wingers are older than left-wingers. Looking at education, it turns out that 
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left-wingers are significantly more educated than right-wingers (the variable educa-
tion equals 1 if the education level is either 3 or 4 on the 1 to 4 scale of the main 
text). We find very little evidence for a systematic difference in religious affiliations 
between left- and right-wingers but also between extremists and other GIP partici-
pants (the frequency of Catholics and Protestants in the GIP is around 20% in both 
cases).
Robustness check: assignment of types
Table 9 repeats the analysis of Table 3, but assigns types either based on the first 
(columns 1–4) or the second choice (columns 5–8) only. The main variable of 
interest is the coefficient on efficiency. Comparing the coefficients and signifi-
cance levels, we see that in all regressions efficiency types are less likely to support 
Table 6  Ordered Logit, policy preferences
Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01 , **p < 0.05 , * p < 0.1
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Reduce Inequality Income Tax
W15 W17 W21 W17
Maxi-min − 0.0372 − 0.0748 0.0227 − 0.114
(0.0954) (0.0962) (0.0958) (0.101)
Efficiency − 0.394** − 0.750*** − 0.263* − 0.436***
(0.158) (0.161) (0.156) (0.167)
Maxi-max − 0.896 − 0.901 − 0.784 − 0.263
(0.591) (0.577) (0.591) (0.575)
Male 0.265*** 0.318*** 0.416*** − 0.0742
(0.0957) (0.0968) (0.0957) (0.101)
Age quantile 0.210*** 0.182*** 0.127*** 0.253***
(0.0438) (0.0441) (0.0436) (0.0464)
Income − 0.222*** − 0.261*** − 0.283*** − 0.236***
(0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0406)
Education 0.0904 0.0444 0.188*** 0.149**
(0.0574) (0.0586) (0.0583) (0.0617)
Trust government − 0.165*** − 0.152*** − 0.198*** − 0.0764
(0.0532) (0.0543) (0.0542) (0.0563)
East 0.348*** 0.405*** 0.350*** 0.0967
(0.111) (0.113) (0.112) (0.116)
Treatment control 0.202** − 0.413***
(0.0888) (0.0894)
Observations 1701 1686 1652 1676
Pseudo-R2 0.0201 0.0251 0.0256 0.0197
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Table 7  The dependent 
variables is a dummy whether 
the participant donated money 
to charity
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01 , **p < 0.05 , 
* p < 0.1
Dependent Variable Donation
(1) (2)
OLS Logistic
Maxi-min − 0.0319* − 0.318**
(0.0163) (0.159)
Efficiency − 0.0597** − 0.629**
(0.0244) (0.291)
Maxi-max 0.0909 0.764
(0.117) (0.666)
Age quantile 0.0554*** 0.563***
(0.00778) (0.0796)
Income 0.0288*** 0.235***
(0.00780) (0.0572)
Male − 0.0367** − 0.372**
(0.0165) (0.163)
Education 0.0345*** 0.317***
(0.00960) (0.102)
Trust government − 0.000490 − 0.0131
(0.00851) (0.0844)
Amount donated − 0.0146** − 0.126***
(0.00571) (0.0435)
East − 0.0133 − 0.128
(0.0185) (0.192)
Constant 0.0927 − 2.561***
(0.0733) (0.603)
Observations 1792 1792
Table 8  Comparing the far left 
and far right participants
The sample includes 30 left- and 17 right-wingers in the stricter defi-
nition (ideology equal to (1) or (11), respectively) and 124 left- and 
42 right-wingers in wider definition (ideology equal to (1, 2) or (10, 
11), respectively). P-value is from 2 test on independence of distri-
butions
Strict definition Wider definition
Left Right p-value Left Right p-value
Female 40.0% 29.4% 0.47 47.6% 35.7% 0.18
East 23.3% 35.3% 0.38 30.7% 31% 0.97
Young 37.0% 26.7% 0.50 42.5% 25.0% 0.05
Educated 43.3% 11.8% 0.03 40.3% 19.1% 0.01
Catholic 30.0% 17.7% 0.35 23.4% 23.8% 0.96
Protestant 16.7% 17.7% 0.93 21.8% 33.3% 0.13
 D. Müller, S. Renes 
1 3
Ta
bl
e 
9 
 T
he
 e
ffe
ct
 o
f t
yp
es
 o
n 
po
lic
y 
ch
oi
ce
s, 
fa
irn
es
s t
yp
es
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
si
ng
le
 c
ho
ic
e
St
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s i
n 
pa
re
nt
he
se
s, 
**
* p
<
0
.0
1
 , *
* p
<
0
.0
5
 , *
 p
<
0
.1
W
av
e
C
ho
ic
e 
1
C
ho
ic
e 
2
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
Re
du
ce
 In
eq
ua
lit
y
In
co
m
e 
Ta
x
Re
du
ce
 In
eq
ua
lit
y
In
co
m
e 
Ta
x
W
15
W
17
W
21
W
15
W
17
W
21
M
ax
i-m
in
−
 0
.0
01
34
−
 0
.0
19
0
0.
03
17
−
 0
.0
61
5
−
 0
.1
21
**
−
 0
.0
89
3*
−
 0
.0
68
9
−
 0
.0
57
9
(0
.0
51
0)
(0
.0
51
2)
(0
.0
55
8)
(0
.0
39
5)
(0
.0
49
6)
(0
.0
49
9)
(0
.0
54
5)
(0
.0
38
6)
Effi
ci
en
cy
−
 0
.0
92
2
−
 0
.2
13
**
*
−
 0
.0
31
6
−
 0
.1
51
**
*
−
 0
.1
89
**
−
 0
.3
82
**
*
−
 0
.2
07
**
−
 0
.1
51
**
(0
.0
66
8)
(0
.0
67
9)
(0
.0
73
6)
(0
.0
52
3)
(0
.0
75
5)
(0
.0
76
4)
(0
.0
81
6)
(0
.0
58
9)
M
ax
i-m
ax
−
 0
.0
46
0
−
 0
.5
31
**
*
−
 0
.2
09
−
 0
.0
79
0
−
 0
.0
58
2
−
 0
.2
47
*
−
 0
.1
84
−
 0
.0
63
0
(0
.1
80
)
(0
.1
83
)
(0
.2
01
)
(0
.1
41
)
(0
.1
46
)
(0
.1
49
)
(0
.1
62
)
(0
.1
15
)
M
al
e
0.
11
3*
*
0.
13
2*
**
0.
19
5*
**
−
 0
.0
42
2
0.
12
5*
*
0.
14
7*
**
0.
21
0*
**
−
 0
.0
42
4
(0
.0
48
7)
(0
.0
49
1)
(0
.0
53
4)
(0
.0
37
8)
(0
.0
48
6)
(0
.0
49
0)
(0
.0
53
3)
(0
.0
37
8)
A
ge
 Q
ua
nt
ile
0.
10
6*
**
0.
09
75
**
*
0.
05
67
**
0.
10
6*
**
0.
10
5*
**
0.
09
59
**
*
0.
05
48
**
0.
10
6*
**
(0
.0
22
1)
(0
.0
22
2)
(0
.0
24
1)
(0
.0
17
1)
(0
.0
22
1)
(0
.0
22
2)
(0
.0
24
1)
(0
.0
17
1)
In
co
m
e
−
 0
.1
45
**
*
−
 0
.1
63
**
*
−
 0
.1
72
**
*
−
 0
.1
03
**
*
−
 0
.1
46
**
*
−
 0
.1
65
**
*
−
 0
.1
72
**
*
−
 0
.1
04
**
*
(0
.0
19
3)
(0
.0
19
6)
(0
.0
21
3)
(0
.0
15
1)
(0
.0
19
2)
(0
.0
19
6)
(0
.0
21
2)
(0
.0
15
1)
Ed
uc
at
io
n
0.
03
35
0.
00
61
7
0.
09
07
**
*
0.
05
78
**
0.
03
69
0.
00
69
5
0.
09
48
**
*
0.
05
27
**
(0
.0
29
4)
(0
.0
29
8)
(0
.0
32
4)
(0
.0
22
9)
(0
.0
29
2)
(0
.0
29
6)
(0
.0
32
2)
(0
.0
22
8)
Tr
us
t G
ov
.
−
 0
.0
49
6*
−
 0
.0
55
6*
*
−
 0
.1
06
**
*
−
 0
.0
18
8
−
 0
.0
45
1*
−
 0
.0
52
8*
*
−
 0
.1
04
**
*
−
 0
.0
17
5
(0
.0
26
2)
(0
.0
26
5)
(0
.0
28
9)
(0
.0
20
4)
(0
.0
26
2)
(0
.0
26
4)
(0
.0
28
8)
(0
.0
20
4)
Ea
st
0.
20
2*
**
0.
19
1*
**
0.
22
5*
**
0.
03
20
0.
19
6*
**
0.
19
1*
**
0.
22
3*
**
0.
03
26
(0
.0
56
5)
(0
.0
56
7)
(0
.0
62
2)
(0
.0
43
7)
(0
.0
56
5)
(0
.0
56
7)
(0
.0
62
1)
(0
.0
43
8)
C
on
st
an
t
2.
28
6*
**
2.
53
0*
**
2.
70
3*
**
2.
08
8*
**
2.
32
7*
**
2.
55
6*
**
2.
75
0*
**
2.
08
6*
**
(0
.1
14
)
(0
.1
12
)
(0
.1
25
)
(0
.0
86
6)
(0
.1
15
)
(0
.1
13
)
(0
.1
26
)
(0
.0
87
1)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
20
77
20
59
20
17
20
48
20
74
20
56
20
14
20
45
R
2
0.
05
4
0.
06
6
0.
06
9
0.
04
9
0.
05
8
0.
06
9
0.
07
2
0.
04
9
1 3
Fairness views and political preferences: evidence from a…
government intervention as we already found in Table 3 before. It seems that the 
effects are somewhat stronger for the second distributional choice than for the first 
one.
When comparing behavior in the first and the second choice, we find that 134 
subject switched from the efficient allocation to the maxi-min allocation. The effi-
ciency choice had a total value of €22 in the first, but only €18 (only €1 more than 
maxi-min) in the second choice. That is, choosing the efficient allocation was less 
attractive in the second choice compared to the first. It thus seems that the subjects 
who chose to remain with the efficient distribution in the second choice display an 
even higher preference for efficiency and also differ more strongly from the egalitar-
ians in their political attitudes.
References
Aguiar F, Becker A, Miller L (2013) Whose impartiality? An experimental study of veiled stakeholders, 
involved spectators and detached observers. Econ Philos 29(02):155–174
Alesina A, Fuchs-Schündeln N (2007) Goodbye lenin (or not?): the effect of communism on people’s 
preferences. Am Econ Rev 97(4):1507–1528
Alger I, Weibull JW (2013) Homo moralis–preference evolution under incomplete information and assor-
tative matching. Econometrica 81(6):2269–2302
Almås I, Cappelen AW, Tungodden B (2019) Cutthroat capitalism versus cuddly socialism: Are ameri-
cans more meritocratic and efficiency-seeking than scandinavians? Journal of Political Economy
Amiel Y, Cowell FA, Gaertner W (2009) To be or not to be involved: a questionnaire-experimental view 
on Harsanyi’s utilitarian ethics. Soc Choice Welf 32(2):299–316
Andreoni J, Vesterlund L (2001) Which is the fair sex? Gender differences in altruism. Q J Econ 
116(1):293–312
Becchetti L, Antoni GD, Ottone S, Solferino N (2011) Spectators versus stakeholders with or without 
veil of ignorance: the difference it makes for justice and chosen distribution criteria. Working Paper
Bellemare C, Kröger S, Van Soest A (2008) Measuring inequity aversion in a heterogeneous population 
using experimental decisions and subjective probabilities. Econometrica 76(4):815–839
Blom AG, Gathmann C, Krieger U (2015) Setting up an online panel representative of the general popu-
lation the german internet panel. Field Methods, 27(4):391–408
Blom AG, Bosnjak M, Cornilleau A, Cousteaux A-S, Das M, Douhou S, Krieger U (2016) A comparison 
of four probability-based online and mixed-mode panels in Europe. Soc Sci Comput Rev 34(1):8–25
Blom AG, Herzing JME, Cornesse C, Sakshaug JW, Krieger U, Bossert D (2017) Does the recruitment 
of offline households increase the sample representativeness of probability-based online panels? evi-
dence from the german internet panel. Social Science Computer Review, 35(4):498–520
Bolton GE, Ockenfels A (2000) Erc: a theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. Am Econ Rev, pp 
166–193
Bosmans K, Schokkaert E (2004) Social welfare, the veil of ignorance and purely individual risk: An 
empirical examination. Research on Economic Inequality 11:85–114
Brafman RI, Tennenholtz M (1997) On the axiomatization of qualitative decision criteria. In: AAAI/
IAAI, pp 76–81. Citeseer
Cappelen AW, Hole AD, Sørensen E, Tungodden B (2007) The pluralism of fairness ideals: An experi-
mental approach. American Economic Review, 97(3):818–827
Cappelen AW, Konow J, Sørensen E, Tungodden B (2013) Just luck: an experimental study of risk-taking 
and fairness. Am Econ Rev 103(4):1398–1413
Cappelen AW, Nygaard K, Sørensen E, Tungodden B (2015) Social preferences in the lab: a comparison 
of students and a representative population. Scand J Econ 117(4):1306–1326
Cettolin E, Riedl A (2016) Justice under uncertainty. Manage Sci 63(11):3739–3759
Charness G, Rabin M (2002) Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Q J Econ, pp 817–869
Croson R, Konow J (2009) Social preferences and moral biases. J Econ Behav Org 69(3):201–212
 D. Müller, S. Renes 
1 3
Engel C (2011) Dictator games: a meta study. Exp Econ 14(4):583–610
Engelmann D, Strobel M (2004) Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distri-
bution experiments. Am Econ Rev, pp 857–869
Fehr E, Schmidt KM (1999) A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Q J Econ, pp 817–868
Fisman R, Kariv S, Markovits D (2007) Individual preferences for giving. Am Econ Rev 97(5):1858–1876
Fisman R, Jakiela P, Kariv S (2017) Distributional preferences and political behavior. J Public Econ 
155:1–10
Frohlich N, Oppenheimer JA (1990) Choosing justice in experimental democracies with production. Am 
Polit Sci Rev 84(02):461–477
Frohlich N, Oppenheimer JA (1992) Choosing justice: an experimental approach to ethical theory, vol 22. 
University of California Press, California
Frohlich N, Oppenheimer JA, Eavey CL (1987a) Choices of principles of distributive justice in experi-
mental groups. Am J Polit Sci, pp 606–636
Frohlich N, Oppenheimer JA, Eavey CL (1987b) Laboratory results on Rawls’s distributive justice. Br J 
Polit Sci 17(1):1–21
Gaertner W, Schokkaert E (2011) Empirical social choice: questionnaire-experimental studies on dis-
tributive justice. Cambridge University Press
Green JE (2013) Rawls and the forgotten figure of the most advantaged: in defense of reasonable envy 
toward the superrich. Am Polit Sci Rev 107(1):123–138
Gsottbauer E, Müller D, Müller S, Trautmann S, Zudenkova G (2020) Social class and (un)ethical behav-
ior: Causal versus correlational evidence. Innsbruck Working Paper Series
Harsanyi J (1953) Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk-taking. J Polit Econ 
61(5):434
Harsanyi JC (1955) Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility. J 
Polit Econ 63(4):309–321
Kahneman D, Knetsch JL, Thaler RH (1986) Fairness and the assumptions of economics. J Bus, pp 
S285–S300
Kerschbamer R, Müller D (2020) Social preferences and political attitudes: an online experiment on a 
large heterogeneous sample. J Public Econ, pp 182
Konow J (2000) Fair shares: accountability and cognitive dissonance in allocation decisions. Am Econ 
Rev, pp 1072–1091
Konow J (2003) Which is the fairest one of all? A positive analysis of justice theories. J Econ Lit 
41(4):1188–1239
Konow J (2009) Is fairness in the eye of the beholder? An impartial spectator analysis of justice. Soc 
Choice Welf 33(1):101–127
Kuziemko I, Norton MI, Saez E (2015) How elastic are preferences for redistribution? Evidence from 
randomized survey experiments. Am Econ Rev 105(4):1478–1508
Michelbach PA, Scott JT, Matland RE, Bornstein BH (2003) Doing rawls justice: An experimental study 
of income distribution norms. American Journal of Political Science, 47(3):523–539
Mitchell G, Tetlock PE, Mellers BA, Ordonez LD (1993) Judgments of social justice: compromises 
between equality and efficiency. J Personal Soc Psychol 65(4):629
Müller D (2019) The anatomy of distributional preferences with group identity. J Econ Behav Org 
166:785–807
Posner RA (1983) The economics of justice. Harvard University Press
Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Harvard
Roemer JE (1996) Egalitarian perspectives: essays in philosophical economics. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge
Schildberg-Hörisch H (2010) Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment. J Public 
Econ 94(11):1062–1066
Smeets P, Bauer R, Gneezy U (2015) Giving behavior of millionaires. Proc Natl Acad Sci 
112(34):10641–10644
Traub S, Seidl C, Schmidt U, Levati M (2005) Friedman, harsanyi, rawls, boulding-or somebody else? an 
experimental investigation of distributive justice. Soc Choice Welf 24(2):283–309
Trautmann ST, van de Kuilen G, Zeckhauser RJ (2013) Social class and (un) ethical behavior a frame-
work, with evidence from a large population sample. Perspect Psychol Sci 8(5):487–497
1 3
Fairness views and political preferences: evidence from a…
Wright R (2010) The moral animal: why we are, the way we are: the new science of evolutionary psy-
chology. Vintage
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
